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COMMENT
Unpacking Wolf Packs
Wolf-pack activism has surged in the past three years. A wolf pack
is composed of a group of activist investors working in unison to gain
control of corporate boards. These activist investors collectively buy stock
in a public company and then leverage their aggregate stake to influence
corporate decision making.' Wolf packs allow activist investors to pool their
informational and financial resources, thereby greatly reducing the cost of
seizing corporate control.' In the past two years, wolf packs have targeted
companies including Sotheby's, Allergan, and DuPont.4 The rise of wolf packs
may permanently shift the balance of power between corporate boards and
control-seeking shareholders.'
This Comment examines the law's seemingly inconsistent treatment of
wolf packs, and it advances a disclosure framework that seeks to rebalance the
powers of corporate boards and wolf packs. Securities law and corporate law
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diverge in their approach to wolf packs. On the one hand, section 13(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act -designed to alert corporate boards and shareholders
to takeover threats -construes wolf packs narrowly. As a result, boards and
shareholders may not receive advance notice of wolf-pack activism. One the
other hand, the Delaware Court of Chancery recently adopted a relatively
expansive conception of wolf packs that may overly punish activist investors. I
argue that requiring wolf packs to make prophylactic disclosures will strike the
right balance. It will allow boards to better respond to wolf-pack activism and
enable courts to better adjudicate the proportionality of such responses.
The Comment proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the history and
characteristics of wolf-pack activism. Part II argues that current laws
simultaneously underregulate and overregulate wolf packs to the detriment of
both boards and investors. Finally, Part III explains how prophylactic
disclosures can help restore the balance of power between wolf packs and
corporate boards.
1. THE ORIGINS AND ANATOMY OF A WOLF PACK
Wolf packs emerged from the recent growth in shareholder activism.
Activist shareholders are typically hedge funds that generate profit by
implementing major changes in public companies. Such changes may involve
altering a company's financing structure, investment strategy, or number of
employees.! To effectuate change within a public company, activist investors
often purchase a large stake in the public company and then lobby the
company's management to implement changes that the investors believe would
increase shareholder value. Activist investors may also seek to win the support
of the company's other shareholders via a proxy contest to install the activist
investors' choice of directors on the corporate board.8 Fights to win over
shareholders are aggressive and highly public; oftentimes, they create
tremendous pressure for a company's incumbent directors to acquiesce to the
activists' demands.9
Activist hedge funds took off in the early 1990s after the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) began loosening its proxy statement rules.o in
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2014, at 88, go.
8. See id. at 92.
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1992, the SEC stopped censoring proxy statements, allowing activist
shareholders to be more vocal in their criticisms of incumbent corporate
boards." Seven years later, the SEC adopted Rule 14a-12, which allowed
activist investors to lobby other shareholders before filing a proxy statement."
The rule allowed activists to gauge the level of support from other shareholders
and mitigate the risk of losing a costly proxy contest.
The growth of activist hedge funds led to the emergence of wolf packs. The
phenomenon first came to the attention of the courts in 2002 when a real estate
company sued three investment funds for securities fraud in Hallwood Realty
Partners, LP v. Gotham Partners, LP.' Under section 1 3(d)(3) of the Securities
Exchange Act, groups of persons must disclose beneficial ownership of more
than five percent of a company's stock.' The Second Circuit, however,
construed section 13(d)(3) narrowly and held that the discussions between
investment firms regarding their purchases did not make the firms a "group.""
The Hallwood decision loosened regulatory oversight of wolf packs and fueled
their growth.' 6 In the last two years, as the markets have recovered, wolf packs
have rapidly reemerged.
Economists believe that wolf packs tend to form when a single lead investor
acquires a substantial stake in a target company.'" After the lead company
makes its purchase, it often encourages other activist investors to purchase
stocks in the target company.'9 The activist investor makes these tips in the
hopes of securing a broader coalition of votes for its proxy fight. The lead
activist's large purchase may also independently spur purchases from other
activist investors.2' These investors may catch wind of upcoming activist
activity and buy stocks in an attempt to profit from the lead activist's success.
In short, although wolf packs may not be deemed a "group" under securities
law, there is both empirical and anecdotal evidence of coordination among
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12. Id. at 689.
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activist investors.2' Studies indicate that stock prices of a target diverge from
market averages in the ten to twenty days before activists publicly disclose
securities purchases.'
Wolf packs, however, appear to collapse as quickly as they form. The
duration of an activist's participation is tied to how the activist plans to
generate return. 3 In cases where a proxy fight merely seeks to replace a
company's board of directors, wolf-pack participants tend to sell their shares
shortly after the change is accomplished.' In cases where the wolf pack seeks
to restructure the company, the participants may hold onto their stakes for a
longer period of time while the changes are carried out.2 s Most participants in a
wolf pack do not hold onto their portfolio in the long run, with most exiting
within a year.2 6 Some participants will even drop out before the proxy fight. 7
II. HOW CURRENT LAW SIMULTANEOUSLY UNDERREGULATES AND
OVERREGULATES WOLF PACKS
A fundamental goal of both securities and corporate law is the protection of
shareholder interests. 8 An important component of this goal is preserving the
balance of power between control-seeking shareholders and corporate
boards. 9 The two parties serve as a check on each other: control-seeking
shareholders help monitor corporate boards while corporate boards owe
fiduciary duties to prevent control-seeking investors from exploiting their
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holdings to the disadvantage of minority shareholders.3 o Securities law seeks to
balance the competing interests of control-seeking shareholders and boards
through disclosure rules.3 ' Meanwhile, corporate law seeks to achieve the same
end through ex post review of board decisions." In the case of wolf packs,
however, neither securities law nor corporate law appears to adequately balance
the power of boards and control-seeking activist investors.
A. How WolfPacks Defeat Section 13 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act
Enacted in 1968 under the Williams Act, section 13(d)33 was a response to
the growth of all-cash takeovers that escaped the disclosure requirements
under section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act.' Congress believed disclosures
were necessary to ensure that shareholders were promptly alerted to possible
changes in company management and corporate control.s Consequently,
section 13(d) requires all persons or groups holding a five percent or greater
stake in a public company to disclose their ownership within ten days of
surpassing the five percent threshold. 6
Wolf packs, however, are able to evade section 1 3(d) in three ways. First,
wolf packs can simply avoid detection if each of the activist investors acquires
less than a five percent stake in the target. In 2011, the Second Circuit
reaffirmed the narrow scope of "group" under section 1 3(d) in CSX Corp. v.
Children's Investment Fund Management (UK) LLP." The court held that
specific evidence of coordination among the shareholders is required in order
for them to be deemed a group."8 Currently, it is particularly difficult for
30. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder
Disclosure, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 39, 45 (2012); Briggs, supra note 6, at 718.
31. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 28, at 612, 621.
32. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 28, at 2.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012).
34. See Adam 0. Emmerich et al., Fair Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts on the
Economics ofBlockholder Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power, 3 HARY. Bus.
L. REv. 135, 144 & n-30 (2013).
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36. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d).
37. 654 F. 3d 276, 284 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that "a precise finding, adequately supported by
specific evidence, of whether a group existed for purposes of acquiring CSX shares outright
during the relevant period needs to be made").
38. Id.
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corporate boards to identify and classify activist shareholders who purchase
less than a five percent stake as a "group.""
Second, wolf packs can partially evade section 1 3(d) when only the lead
activist shareholder discloses its ownership stake. Such a move can lead
corporate boards to underestimate the activist threat. For example, in the fight
over control of Barnes and Noble, the lead activist investor held an 18.7% stake
in the company. 4o However, the actual wolf pack controlled a 36.14% stake.4
The wolf pack's sizeable stake meant that the activist investors only needed
13.87% of the shareholder votes to establish the majority required to oust the
incumbent board.
Third, the ten-day disclosure window under section 13(d) critically
undermines the value of any potential disclosures from wolf-pack members.
Activist investors typically engage in a buying frenzy during this ten-day
period42 in order to maximize their profits from future increases in share price.
A wolf pack's aggregate shareholdings thus concentrate potential gains among
a small handful of activist investors.
The ability of wolf packs to evade section 1 3(d) procedurally and
substantively shifts power away from other shareholders and corporate boards
and toward activist funds that may have relatively short investment horizons.
Investors with short investment horizons may be less keen on costly but
potentially lucrative research and development spending, preferring instead to
use excess cash reserves to bolster immediate earnings and stock prices. In
particular, institutional shareholders with long-term investment objectives and
corporate management seeking to implement long-term strategic goals may
find themselves particularly disadvantaged in the face of increasing wolf-pack
activism.43
39. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 2, at 28.
40. Yucaipa Am. All. Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 324 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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B. How Judicial Doctrine in Corporate Law May Cast an Overbroad Net over
WolfPacks
Corporate boards traditionally adopt poison pills in response to control-
seeking shareholders." The poison pill is a share dilution device invented in
the 198os that makes it very costly to acquire control of the target company.45
The Delaware Chancery Court's recent decision upholding Sotheby's poison
pill, Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht,46 appears to have adopted a broad stance
against collaboration among activist investors.
Third Point involved the ongoing contest for control of Sotheby's. In
May 2013, three activist funds - Third Point LLC (Third Point), Trian
Fund Management, L.P. (Trian), and Marcato Capital Management LLC
(Marcato) -began purchasing shares in auction giant Sotheby's.' In response
to the possibility that the three investors would form a wolf pack, the Sotheby's
board adopted a poison pill that would be triggered if any of the three funds
acquired more than a ten percent ownership stake.*8 In reviewing the
proportionality of Sotheby's response, Vice Chancellor Parsons considered the
threat to include parties acting with "conscious parallelism"49 -a significantly
broader concept than the "group" definition under section 13(d). Ignoring the
absence of formal agreements between Trian, Marcato, and Third Point, Vice
Chancellor Parsons noted that there "was the objectively reasonable possibility
that Third Point was working in connection with one or more other hedge
funds in an attempt to create a control block within the Company's stockholder
base."so
Third Point is no outlier. In Yucaipa American Alliance Fund II, LP v.
Riggio,s a case decided in 2010, then-Vice Chancellor Strine suggested that a
poison pill that capped activist share ownership at twenty percent was justified
to prevent two activist investors from forming "a de facto control bloc . . .
through conscious parallelism."' In short, corporate law has seemingly
adopted a much broader view of wolf packs than securities law.
44. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 28, at 522-32.
45. Id.
46. No. 9 4 6 9 -VCP, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).
47. Id. at *3-4
48. Id. at *9-11.
49. Id. at *20.
so. Id.
51. 1 A. 3d 310 (Del. Ch. 2010).
52. Id. at 359-60 n.254.
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While securities law underregulates wolf packs, corporate law may well do
the opposite. First, using "conscious parallelism" to identify wolf packs may
overestimate the actual strength of activist alliances. Wolf-pack activists have
different agendas and some may exit before a proxy contest.5 In Third Point,
Trian sold its stake in Sotheby's a month after the company implemented its
poison pill.54 Meanwhile, Marcato, unlike Third Point, was more interested in
getting Sotheby's to return its cash reserves to investors than in implementing
management changes. After the Sotheby's board negotiated an end to Third
Point's agitation earlier this year, Marcato was left to lobby against the board
alone. 5 The Sotheby's saga suggests that, in some instances, wolf packs can be
relatively loose coalitions with different investment agendas and timelines.
Second, the Delaware courts' sparse conceptualization of "conscious
parallelism" may have a chilling effect on activists. Neither Third Point nor
Yucaipa clearly articulated what constitutes "conscious parallelism." Rather, the
courts' opinions rely heavily on the facts and weigh the perceived threat against
the specific provisions of the board's poison pill?6 Such analysis introduces
significant legal uncertainty and may lead to excessive deterrence against wolf
packing. In an increasingly crowded activist market, there is a real risk of
overpunishing wolf-pack activism: stock prices may suffer due to increased
market uncertainty over the legality and potential success of activist campaigns,
including those that may yield value for shareholders. Activist investors may
also be less inclined to share information regarding potential target companies,
as they have done in the past.17
Finally, the Delaware courts' use of "conscious parallelism" to uphold a
poison pill may encourage corporate boards to adopt more expansive poison
pills. Currently, most poison pills use the securities law definition of "group"
to define wolf packs." However, corporate boards may be inclined to adopt the
broader Delaware definition as an additional means of deterrence. While these
pills would likely be contested in court, the fact-intensive review required to
53. See Bray et al., supra note 18, at 4-8; Coffee & Palia, supra note 2, at 36.
54. See Margaret Collins, Peltz's Trian Sold State Street Shares in Third Quarter, BLOOMBERG Bus.
(Nov. 15, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2ol3-11-14/peltz-s
-trian-sold-sotheby-s-state-street-stakes-last-quarter [http://perma.cc/TJ9S-N3NK].
sS. David Benoit, Marcato Urges Sotheby's To Buy Back Stock, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2015, 1:19
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/marcato-urges-sothebys-to-buy-back-stock-1424456393
[http://perma.cc/U4UF-M2BJ].
56. See Leonard Chazen & Jack S. Bodner, Conscious Parallelism May Justii a Wolf Pack
Pill, LAw360 (May 27, 2014, 9:45 PM), http://www.law36o.com/articles/54o818/conscious
-parallelism-may-justify-a-wolf-pack-pill [http://perma.cc/349E-GBKP].





determine the validity of such pills may place undue time and cost burdens on
activist investors.
Ill. TAMING THE WOLF PACK: THE VALUE OF PROPHYLACTIC
DISCLOSURES
The law's treatment of wolf packs faces timing and identification problems.
Securities law allows wolf packs to slip under its disclosure rules. Corporate
law, meanwhile, may cast an overbroad net on wolf packs.
Preemptive disclosures may provide a means of resolving both the timing
and identification problems surrounding wolf packs. This Part recommends a
preemptive disclosure framework that requires three amendments to Rule 1 3d
under the Securities Exchange Act: (1) shortening the current ten-day grace
period for making a Schedule 13D filing disclosing when an investor or group
acquires a five percent or greater stake in a public company, (2) broadening the
definition of "group" under Rule 13d- 5 in order to require all activist investors
to name the other investors to whom they have disclosed their intention to
engage in a proxy fight once they collectively acquire a five percent or greater
stake in a public company, and (3) imposing penalties for activists who fail to
fully disclose the identities of wolf-pack members.
The framework's first requirement provides earlier notification of potential
changes to a targeted company. The requirement also limits activist investors'
ability to use the current ten-day reporting period to amass a de facto
controlling stake. While this requirement affects all shareholder activists, its
impact would be most acutely felt by wolf packs that benefit from the
coordination opportunities provided by the ten-day buffer and reap the
greatest profits from a successful activist campaign. As such, this requirement
would not only better alert boards to possible wolf-pack activity, but also level
the playing field for activists who are not part of the wolf pack.
The second requirement for prophylactic disclosure from activist investors
addresses the fact that wolf packs are most likely to form when a lead activist
investor tips off other activists about an upcoming proxy fight.59 This
requirement is designed to identify wolf-pack members without having to
resort to circumstantial evidence or proxy measures such as 'conscious
parallelism." Rather than trying to establish a bright-line test for what
constitutes a wolf pack and risk substantive evasion, the SEC and the courts
ought to shift the task to activists who, as insiders, are most apt to know their
membership. Since activists may seek to conceal the identity of the wolf pack
by either overdisclosing or underdisclosing the names of participants,
59. See Bray et al., supra note 18, at 24-26; Coffee & Palia, supra note 2, at 23-33.
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I recommend, as a third requirement, introducing penalties to deter such
behavior. For example, funds that have received solicitations but fail to disclose
their membership in a wolf pack should be penalized. Membership in a wolf
pack could be identified ex post by establishing a rebuttable presumption that
major purchasers of target company stock in the days immediately leading up
to a Schedule 13D filing are members of the wolf pack. Penalties for investors
that fail to disclose their membership in a wolf pack could include
requirements to disgorge profits or dispose of stock holdings.
While this proposal is novel, it is well situated within the bounds of both
securities and corporate law. Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Congress expressly provided that the SEC could
shorten reporting windows. 6o Additionally, Schedule 13D, which shareholders
are required to file when they exceed a five percent ownership threshold, asks
shareholders to declare the purpose of their purchases and "contracts,
arrangements, understandings or relationships . . . with respect to any
securities of the issuer.,6 Moreover, the Second Circuit has explicitly held that
"the purpose of section 1 3(d) is to alert the marketplace to every large, rapid
aggregation or accumulation of securities, regardless of technique employed,
which might represent a potential shift in corporate control."6 ' Additionally,
corporate law requires that corporate boards only deploy poison pills that are
proportional to the threat posed. 63 The disclosure framework would not only
help corporate boards better determine what constitutes a proportional
response to a wolf pack, but would also make boards more accountable for
disproportionate responses.
CONCLUSION
This Comment argues that current securities law and corporate law are
inconsistent and ineffective in their treatment of wolf packs. Securities law
adopts an excessively narrow view of wolf packs, allowing them to slip past its
disclosure rules. Corporate law, on the other hand, has construed wolf
packs far more broadly and risks overpunishing investors. I argue that a
prophylactic disclosure framework will correct the gaps in the current law and
6o. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 929R, 124 Stat. 1376, 1866 (2010) (modifying section 13(d)(i) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to require disclosure "within ten days after such acquisition ... or within such
shorter time as the Commission may establish by rule").
61. 17 C.F.R. § 24 o.13d-loi (2015).
62. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971).




restore the proper power balance among corporate boards and control-seeking
shareholders.
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